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Abstract
This paper studies the long-run welfare effect of the extra volatility of country
spread due to the possibility of sudden stops. Both analytical and numerical results
show that sudden stops have weaker output impact when the small open economy is
more open to trade. However, welfare consequences and policy implication of sudden
stops depend on the financial friction faced by the small open economy. When it is
free to adjust foreign debt, the cost of sudden stops is decreasing in trade openness,
which implies the optimality of open trade policy. In this case, external shocks may be
welfare improving. In addition, the economy will gain from counter-cyclical tariff rate
policies. On the other hand, when it is costly to adjust foreign debt, the cost of sudden
stops may be increasing in trade openness, which implies the optimality of a closed
trade policy. In this case, the nature of the policy and how the government implements
the policy matter. The results hold in economies with and without the working capital
constraint, and in economies with GHH preferences and Cobb-Douglas preferences.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we analyze an important question, whether a small open economy should
adopt an open trade policy or a closed trade policy when external shocks they face become
more volatile perhaps due to the possibility of sudden stops, based on recent development
in the small open economy literature. The situation is further complicated with competing
empirical results about the relationship between the output impact of external shocks and
trade openness, which imply opposite recommendations with respect to trade policy. Calvo
et al. (2004) and Calvo and Talvi (2005) show that economies more open to trade will adjust
their output less when they are hit by sudden stops. However, several other studies show that
greater trade openness increases output growth volatility when the economy is exposed to
external shocks; see Rodrik (1997), Easterly et al. (2001), and Loayza and Raddatz (2006).
We address the question thus raises dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model by
evaluating the relationship between the cost and trade openness in a small open economy.
The cost analyzed refers to the welfare cost associated with the extra volatility of country
spread arising from the possibility of sudden stops.1 Country spread refers to the premium
the small open economy has to pay to borrow in the international capital market, and trade
openness is measured by the ratio of trade turnover to GDP. The results show that (1) with
the same external shocks, less open economies will have larger induced endogenous responses
of output. (2) The relationship between the cost and trade openness depends on whether it
is costly to adjust foreign debt. (3) Exogenous shocks may be welfare improving. And (4)
the sensitivity analysis indicates that these results are indeed robust.
The intuition behind the first result is that less open economies tend to have more volatile
capital. The reason is that the marginal cost of production, in terms of the price of the
imported intermediate input, is higher due to the higher tariff rate, which is also the reason
why these economies are less open to trade. As a result, the demand for capital in a less open
economy is more elastic than that in a more open economy. Thus, capital will adjust more in
a less open economy. When the external shocks become more volatile due to the possibility
of sudden stops, the induced additional volatility of capital is larger in a less open economy
for the same reason, as is that of output. This result provides a theoretical foundation for
the finding of Calvo et al. (2004), even though we do not consider “dollarization” here as
Calvo et al. (2004) do.
It turns out that the larger additional volatility of output does not necessarily lead to a
higher cost. When the economy incurs no additional expenses in adjusting its foreign debt,
the cost of sudden stops decreases with trade openness. In this case, it is optimal to make the
1Mendoza (2001), Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and Loayza et al. (2007) show that a positive possibility
of sudden stops increases the volatility of country spread.
trade door open wider when external shocks become more volatile. By doing so, the marginal
cost of production can be lowered (because the tariff rate is lowered), and production becomes
more efficient. This policy recommendation provides a new perspective by emphasizing the
connection, through the tariff rate, between trade openness and production efficiency. As
argued in this paper, when trade openness is positively correlated with production efficiency
and there are no costs in adjusting foreign debt, the small open economy should adopt open
trade policy to deal with the more volatile external shocks. This policy consideration is in
line with Loayza et al. (2007). They argue that the self-protection method as addressed in
Ehrlich and Becker (1972) may later lead to large domestic shocks.
However, if it is costly to adjust foreign debt, the larger additional volatility of output
usually results in a smaller cost, which implies the optimality of a closed trade policy. The
main reason is because the ability of households to smooth consumption is compromised due
to the debt adjustment costs. The extent to which the ability to smooth consumption is
weakened depends on the level of tariff rate. In this case, there may be two offsetting forces:
one is the gain from the improvement of production efficiency and the other one is the cost
when the ability to smooth consumption is weakened due to financial friction. Consequently,
the cost of sudden stops also depends on the level of tariff rate. The numerical results show
the later force dominates, which leads to the optimality of a closed trade policy.
The third result is that external shocks may be welfare improving. When the repre-
sentative household is a net borrower in the international capital market, its consumption
decreases at an accelerated rate as world interest rates increase. Thus, the indirect utility
function becomes convex in interest rates. As a result, when interest rates are more volatile,
the representative household’s utility will be higher.2 This result extends the discussion
about the relationship between welfare and economic shocks. The literature has shown that
a risk averse household may prefer a volatile economy. For example, Obstfeld and Rogoff
(2000) give a closed form solution to an open economy driven by productivity and monetary
shocks and illustrate the possible positive welfare effect of economic shocks. Bacchetta and
Wincoop (2000) show that depending on the economic structure, high exchange rate volatil-
ity may lead to high welfare of risk averse households. Cho and Cooley (2005) discuss the
positive welfare effect of productivity shocks extensively in a closed economy. Here we show
how the borrowing and lending position affects such a relationship in a dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium model.
This paper extends the discussion to evaluate the welfare effect of time-varying tariff rate
policy. When the tariff rates are counter-cyclical and constitute a stationary process around
a fixed mean, they may improve welfare if there is no financial friction. However, if it is
2This result is disturbing because it is in deep contrast to what people generally believe: With the given
ability to smooth consumption, economic shocks should always be detrimental to welfare.
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costly to adjust the foreign debt position, the nature of the policy and the way how the
government implements the policy matter.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets up the competitive equilib-
rium. Section 3 presents some qualitative results. Section 4 carries out numerical analysis.
Section 5 discusses time-varying tariff rate policy. And Section 6 concludes.
2 The benchmark economy
The model used in this paper is based on Mendoza (1991) with three modifications: inter-
mediate imported inputs, a working capital constraint, and debt adjustment costs. With the
model, there is a role for trade policy when we use Greenwood et al. (1988, GHH hereafter)
preferences augmented with the endogenous subjective discount factor. There are three
types of agents, domestic households, firms, and the government. There are also three real
frictions: capital adjustment costs, debt adjustment costs, and a working capital constraint.
The economy is driven by a joint process of the productivity shocks, the world interest
rate shocks, and the country spread shocks. The external shocks of interest in this paper
are country spread shocks, whose importance has been documented in Neumeyer and Perri
(2005) and Uribe and Yue (2006). The other two shocks are productivity shocks and world
interest rate shocks. In this paper, the possibility of sudden stops is represented by an
increase in the volatility of country spread. This definition is different from others in the
literature. For example, Chari et al. (2005) define sudden stops as exogenous capital inflow
reversal. This definition comes from the fact that the possibility of sudden stops not only
increases the average country spread that a small open economy has to pay, but also makes
the country spread more volatile; see Mendoza (2001). In addition, Aguiar and Gopinath
(2007) argues that business cycles in emerging economies are characterized by sudden stops
and more volatile output, which contrast with those in developed small open economies.
We focus on this model for several reasons. First, the model provides a simple framework
that allows a role for trade policy. Second, the Mendoza (1991) model is widely used in the
small open economy literature. Third, recent studies emphasize the use of this benchmark
economy in explaining countercyclical real interest rates [Neumeyer and Perri (2005)], sta-
tionary trade-balance to GDP ratio [Garc´ıa et al. (2009)], and asset pricing [Jahan-Parvar
et al. (2009)].
3
2.1 The representative household
The representative household chooses hours and consumption to maximize expected lifetime
utility:
max
{ct,ht}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
θtU(ct, ht),
where E0 denotes the mathematical expectation operator conditional on information avail-
able at time 0. The variables θt, ct, and ht denote, respectively, the subjective discount
factor from period t to period 0, consumption, and hours.
In this paper, we consider two types of preferences: GHH utility in the benchmark
economy, and Cobb-Douglas utility as a robustness check.3 The momentum utility function
for GHH utility and the subjective discount factor take the following functional forms
U(ct, ht) =
[
(ct − hωt /ω)1−γ − 1
]
/ (1− γ) , (2.1)
θt+1 = β(c˜t, h˜t)θt, t ≥ 0, θ0 = 1, (2.2)
β(ct, ht) = (1 + ct − hωt /ω)−β1 . (2.3)
The function β represents the subjective discount factor between period t and period t +
1. The variables c˜t and h˜t denote the cross-sectional averages of consumption and hours,
respectively. They are taken as given by individual households.
The use of the endogenous subjective discount factor is one way to assure stationary
behavior of consumption in the small open economy; see Mendoza (1991), Schmitt-Grohe´
and Uribe (2003), and Mulraine (2004). As long as β1 < γ, this preference guarantees a
unique limiting distribution of state variables; that the stationary cardinal utility is suitable
for dynamic programming, and that the consumption good in every period is a normal good;
see Mendoza (1991).
The representative household receives the profit, the capital rent, the labor income, and
income from intermediate input sale to firms.4 The household’s period budget constraint is
given by:
dt + rtkt + wtht + r
m
t mt + Γt ≥ Rt−1dt−1 + ct + it + (1 + τ)mt + Φ(kt+1 − kt) + Ψ(dt),
(2.4)
3For clarity, we discuss the Cobb-Douglas utility in a separate section.
4Even though households receive profit from firms, we do not include profit in the budget constraint
because it is well known that the profit is zero with the assumed constant return to scale technology.
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where choices it, dt, and mt denote investment, foreign debt position, and the imported
intermediate input, respectively.5 rt, wt, and r
m
t denote the rate of return on capital, the
wage rate, and the firm-paid price of the imported intermediate input. τ denotes the tariff
rate levied on the imported intermediate input. Γt denotes the government transfer.
The economy has five state variables. Eq. (2.4) is related to four of them: Rus, CR,
dt−1, and kt, which denote, respectively, world interest rates, country spread, debt position
from the last period, and physical capital today. In addition, Rt−1 denotes the country risk
free rate faced by individual households. The country interest rate, R, is the product of the
world interest rate, Rus, and the country spread, CR. The law of motion of capital is given
by:
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + it, (2.5)
which is standard. Φ(kt+1 − kt) denotes the capital adjustment cost where Φ(kt+1 − kt) =
φ(kt+1 − kt)2/2 for computational simplicity. The cost is included because of its empirical
relevance. Once we introduce the cost, the model can match the behavior of investment.
Ψ(dt) denotes the debt adjustment costs, where Ψ(dt) = ψ [exp(dt − d)− 1] and d denotes
the non-stochastic steady state of net foreign debt. The inclusion of debt adjustment costs is
another way to assure the stationary behavior of debt; see Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003).
This allows us to discuss other different preferences when we set the one-period subjective
discount factor constant, and this directly follows the exercise in Neumeyer and Perri (2005).
The representative household is subject to the non-Ponzi-game condition
lim
j→∞
Et
dt+j+1∏j
s=0Rt+s
≥ 0. (2.6)
The condition rules out the possibility that the representative household borrows to finance
its consumption without limit.
Let βtµt and β
tqt be the Lagrangian multipliers associated with Eqs. (2.4) and (2.5). The
optimality conditions include the non-Ponzi game condition (2.6), period budget constraints
holding with equality (2.4), the law of motion of capital (2.5), and the first order conditions
5The price of mt is normalized to unity. By assuming the relative price of mt to be unity, we close the
door through which the dynamics of terms of trade can affect the economy here.
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as follows:
ct : 0 = µt − uct, (2.7)
ht : 0 = wt + uht/uct, (2.8)
dt : 0 = µt [1−Ψ′(dt)]− θt+1/θt ×RtEtµt+1, (2.9)
mt : 0 = 1 + τ − rmt , (2.10)
it : 0 = 1− qt, (2.11)
kt+1 : 0 = µt (1 + φ(kt+1 − kt))− (2.12)
θt+1/θt × Etµt+1 [1− δ + φ(kt+2 − kt+1) + rt+1] .
All the first order conditions have their usual interpretations.
2.2 The firms
There are many identical final-good production firms. They (100% owned by domestic
households) produce the final good by hiring labor, renting capital, and buying the im-
ported intermediate input from households. Firms use constant return to scale technology
to produce:
yt = ztk
αk
t h
αh
t m
αm
t ,
where 0 < αk < 1, 0 < αh < 1, 0 < αm < 1, and αk + αh + αm = 1. The variables yt, zt, kt,
ht, and mt denote the output of the final good, the total productivity factor, capital, hours
and the intermediate input, respectively. In this economy, the total productivity factor is
assumed to follow the process6
ln(zt+1) = ρ ln(zt) + ε
z
t+1, ε
z
t+1 ∼ IIND(0, σ2z), (2.13)
where ρ denotes the first-order serial autocorrelation of z and 0 < ρ < 1, εzt+1 denotes
the technology shocks, IIND denotes identical and independent normal distribution, and σ2z
denotes the variance of technology shocks.
Firms are subject to a working capital constraint, so that output will drop in the presence
of a positive country spread shock; see Chari et al (2005). In addition, Neumeyer and Perri
(2005) show that a working capital constraint helps amplify the effect of fundamental shocks
on business cycles. For simplicity, we adapt the same constraint as that in Uribe and Yue
6The structural parameters, ρ and σz, are calibrated in the Section 4.2.
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(2006). In particular, the working capital constraint takes the following form
WKt ≥ ϕwtht, (2.14)
where the variable WKt denotes the amount of working capital. The parameter ϕ ≥ 0
denotes the number of quarter wage bills the representative firm needs to pay. If ϕ = 0,
the working capital constraint is dropped from the economy. The representative firm’s debt
position evolves as
dft = Rt−1d
f
t−1 − yt + wtht + rtkt + rmt mt + pit −WKt−1 +WKt,
where dft denotes the debt position of the firms. Defining the net liability of the representative
firm as at = Rtd
f
t −WKt, we can rewrite the budget constraint of the representative firm as
at
Rt
= at−1 − yt + wtht + rtkt + rmt mt + pit +
(
Rt − 1
Rt
)
WKt. (2.15)
Since the representative firm is owned by the representative household, the objective function
of firms is defined by
max E0
∞∑
t=0
θt
µt
µ0
pit,
where µt denotes the marginal wealth utility of the representative household. The objective
function is the same as that in Uribe and Yue (2006). The representative firm is also subject
to the following non Ponzi-game constraint
lim
j→∞
Et
at+j
pijs=0Rt+s
≤ 0. (2.16)
Since firms do not make the investment decision, their problem reduces to a static problem
to maximize its period profit by choosing kt, ht, and mt, and taking zt, rt, wt, and r
m
t as
given. The first order conditions for firms are standard:
kt : rt = αkztk
αk−1
t h
αh
t m
αm
t , (2.17)
ht : wt [1 + ϕ (Rt − 1) /Rt] = αhztkαkt hαh−1t mαmt , (2.18)
mt : r
m
t = αmztk
αk
t h
αh
t m
αm−1
t . (2.19)
These optimality conditions have their usual interpretations. In addition, since any process
at that satisfies Eqs. (2.15) and (2.16) will be optimal for the representative firm, we follow
Uribe and Yue (2006) and set at at 0.
7
2.3 The government
The government collects a stream of tariff tax income, denoted by τmt. These incomes are
rebated back to the domestic households in a lump sum tax, Γt. The government’s sequential
budget constraint is then given by
τmt = Γt, t ≥ 0. (2.20)
We do not consider the government expenditure shocks in order to simplify the discussion.
2.4 Competitive equilibrium
In equilibrium, the capital market, the labor market, and the intermediate input market all
clear. The aggregates equal to the counterparts of the representative household’s because
households are assumed to be identical:
c˜t = ct; (2.21)
h˜t = ht. (2.22)
Proposition 2.1 The competitive equilibrium is defined as a sequence of real allocations {ct,
ht, dt, mt, it, kt+1, c˜t, h˜t, Πt, Γt}∞t=0, and prices {µt, qt, rt, wt, rmt }∞t=0, given d−1, k0, the
law of motion of the interest rate (4.3), and the law of motion of the total productivity factor
(2.13), satisfying the conditions (2.4) with equality, (2.5), (2.6)-(2.12), and (2.17)-(2.22).
3 Some qualitative analysis
In general, there is no analytical solution to this dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model, and hence policy analysis must depend on numerical results. However, the GHH
utility function with the endogenous discount factor allows us to analyze some important
qualitative results of this economy without resorting to numerical calculation . Hence, we
discuss the role of the tariff rate, output impact of external shocks, and welfare effect of
exogenous shocks before we proceed to the numerical analysis.
3.1 The role of the tariff rate
In the optimal tariff literature, a country that has market power on imported goods may
gain from protection by setting tariffs on its imports; see Bagwell and Staiger (1999) for
theoretical analysis and Broda et al. (2008) for empirical evidence. However, the role of the
tariff rate in this paper is different because there is neither any externality nor market failure
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in our economy. We impose a tariff on the intermediate imported inputs for the following
two reasons.
First, the introduction of the tariff rate serves the purpose of controlling the trade open-
ness of the economy. Formally, it is straightforward to show that
TO =
Exports + Imports
y −m =
TB + 2m
y −m = stb +
2
(1 + τ)/αm − 1 , (3.1)
where TO denotes trade openness, TB denotes trade balance, y denotes output, m denotes
the intermediate imported inputs, stb denotes the trade-balance to GDP ratio, τ denotes the
tariff rate, and αm is a structural parameter. The value added (or GDP) to this small open
economy is given y −m. Equation (3.1) makes it clear that trade openness is decreasing in
the tariff rate. The government can adjust the trade openness by changing the value of the
tariff rate.
Second, the imposition of a tariff does not cause loss in the long-run welfare of households
with GHH utility augmented by the endogenous subjective discount factor. In other words,
the non-stochastic steady state of period utility is independent of the tariff rate. Formally,
we have the following non-stochastic steady state of lifetime utility function
V =
[
(c− hω/ω)1−γ − 1] /(1− γ)
1− β(c, h) =
{
[log(R)/β1 − 1]1−γ − 1
}
/(1− γ)
1− 1/R , (3.2)
where β(c, h) denotes the non-stochastic steady state one-period endogenous subjective dis-
count factor. ω, γ, and β1 are structural parameters and R is the non-stochastic steady state
of country interest rate. All of them are fixed when we analyze the welfare cost of sudden
stops. The last equality comes from the following Euler equation in the non-stochastic steady
state:
β(c, h)R = (1 + c− hω/ω)−β1 R = 1.
It is thus clear from Eq. (3.2) that the non-stochastic steady state lifetime utility is indepen-
dent of tariff rates (trade openness). In addition, any change of the non-stochastic steady
state lifetime utility due to the change in R is independent of the tariff rate (trade openness).
This property justifies our approach of focusing on the cost associated with the volatility
of country spread. In principle, the possibility of sudden stops increases not only the volatility
of country spread but also the level of country spread. Thus, the cost associated with
the possibility of sudden stops could be decomposed into two parts: the cost associated
with the change of volatility of country spread (cost of second-order importance), and the
cost associated with the change of level of country spread (cost of first-order importance).
However, in our economy, the change of non-stochastic steady state lifetime utility due to
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the change in the level of country spread is independent of trade openness. Thus, when
we discuss the cost associated with the possibility of sudden stop, we focus on the cost of
second-order importance because the cost of first-order importance is the same across trade
openness when we use GHH preferences.
We plot the non-stochastic steady states of some variables against the tariff rate in Figure
1. It is clear that trade openness is decreasing in the tariff rate while the lifetime utility is
constant across tariff rates. The results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1 In a small open economy, if the preferences are given by Eq. (2.1), the
endogenous subjective discount factor is given by Eqs. (2.2) and (2.3), and the competitive
equilibrium is given by Proposition 2.1, then the non-stochastic steady state lifetime utility
is independent of the tariff rate and the trade openness is decreasing in the tariff rate.
3.2 Why the response of output is larger in a less open economy?
Without debt adjustment costs, we find (as shown in Section 4.4) that the cost (of extra
volatility of country spread) is decreasing in trade openness, which implies that open trade
policy should be preferred. To understand this result, it is crucial to understand why the
less open economy becomes more volatile with the given external shocks.
The higher volatility of output in a less open economy is mainly because capital is more
volatile. The reason is that the marginal cost of production, in terms of the price of the
imported intermediate input, is higher due to the higher tariff rate. Thus, the demand for
capital in a less open economy is more elastic than that in a more open economy. This
difference in demand for capital brings in the difference in the volatilities of capital. For any
realized external shock, capital in the equilibrium will adjust more in a less open economy.
This is because the demand curve is flatter in a less open economy while the supply curve of
capital is the same. When the external shocks become more volatile due to the possibility
of sudden stops, the additional volatility on capital is larger in a less open economy for the
same reason. With the typical calibration of a standard small open economy, this larger
additional volatility of capital is transformed into a higher cost, when it is free to adjust
foreign debt.
Formally, given the model specification, the rate of return on capital is inversely related
to the tariff rate. To see this relationship, we derive the following equation about the rate
of return on capital from Eqs. (2.8), (2.10), (2.17), (2.18), and (2.19):
rt = αk
(
αh
Xt
)(1−αm)$1(αh+ωαm)−1( αm
1 + τ
)αm$1(αh+ωαm)+1
z$1ωt k
−(ω−1)αh$1
t , (3.3)
where $1 = 1/ (ω − αh − ωαm) > 0 with the calibration. Xt = [1 + ϕ (Rt − 1) /Rt] and
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when there is no working capital constraint, Xt = 1.
It is clear from Eq. (3.3) that the negative relationship holds: for a given state of capital
stock and productivity, the rate of return on capital is inversely related to the tariff rate.
Or, the rate is positively related to trade openness.
To see how this relationship leads to more volatile capital in a less open economy, we
start with a simple case by assuming no adjustment cost, no working capital constraint, and
constant productivity. With those assumptions, we combine (2.9) and (2.12) and obtain the
following:
Rt =
Etµt+1 (1− δ + rt+1)
Etµt+1
= 1− δ + αk (αh)(1−αm)$1(αh+ωαm)−1
(
αm
1 + τ
)αm$1(αh+ωαm)+1
k
−(ω−1)αh$1
t+1 .
The last equality comes from the fact that kt+1 is known at the time t; and productivity is
assumed to be constant, so rt+1 is known at the time t.
When there is a positive country spread shock, i.e., Rt goes up, the representative house-
hold will accumulate less capital for the next period, ∆kt+1 < 0. However, the representative
household in the less open economy will accumulate even less capital:
∆kt+1(high tariff) < ∆kt+1(low tariff) < 0.
This result holds because the less open economy has to reduce more capital to equalize
the rate of return on bond and that on capital, i.e., the demand for capital in less open
economies is more elastic. When there is a negative country spread shock, i.e., Rt goes down,
the representative household will accumulate more capital for the next period, ∆kt+1 > 0.
However, the representative household in the less open economy will accumulate even more
for the same reason. Since for any country spread shock, the less open economy has a bigger
adjustment in capital, it is thus of no doubt that capital is more volatile.
This negative relationship holds even if we bring back the working capital constraint.
To see this, we further assume that Rt follows a perfect foresight process, therefore Xt+1 is
known in period t and we obtain the following
(Rt + δ − 1) (Xt+1)(1−αm)$1(αh+ωαm)−1
αk (αh)
(1−αm)$1(αh+ωαm)−1 =
(
αm
1 + τ
)αm$1(αh+ωαm)+1
k
−(ω−1)αh$1
t+1 .
It is clear that for any change happens to the left-hand side of the above equation, capital is
going to adjust but more in a less open economy, as in the previous case. The difference is
that capital may increase, instead of decrease, when Rt increases. This is because when Rt
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goes up, it is usually true that Rt+1 will go up and this will increase Xt+1 as well. However,
if αm is sufficiently large, the term (Xt+1)
(1−αm)$1(αh+ωαm) may go down and bring down the
left-hand side of the equation. As a result, kt+1 may increase and move in the same direction
as Rt. One thing worth mentioning is that this possibility is not in line with empirical facts,
and it is never realized in all the simulations conducted in the numerical experiments.
Proposition 3.2 In a small open economy solely driven by country spread shocks, if there
are no capital and debt adjustment costs, productivity is constant, and the competitive equi-
librium is given by Proposition 2.1, then capital is more volatile in a less open economy.
There is no close-form answer to whether capital is more volatile in a less open economy
when we include productivity shocks, country spread shocks, and those adjustment costs.
We answer that question and the policy implication with numerical results in Section 4.3. It
turns out that the same feature, more volatile capital in a less open economy, shows up after
we introduce capital adjustment costs, debt adjustment costs, productivity shocks, and even
with different preferences. However, the implication for trade policy in economies without
debt adjustment costs is different from that in economies with debt adjustment costs; see
Section 4.4).
3.3 Why country spread shocks may be welfare improving?
One result of this paper is that country spread shocks may enhance utility. This result
seems counter-intuitive. To understand why the risk averse household may like economic
uncertainty associated with country spread, we use the following simple two-period model to
illustrate the welfare effect of country spread shocks. Suppose the representative household
in a small open economy lives for two periods: period 1 and period 2. It has the following
endowment flows: 0 in period 1, and y2 in the period 2. This endowment distribution makes
sure that the household will be a borrower in period 1. In period 1, the household solves a
perfect foresight problem. Formally, the household chooses consumption and the borrowing
and lending position to maximize his utility function:
V = log(c1) + log(c2).
The subjective discount factor is assumed to be 1 in order to simplify the discussion. His
period budget constraints are c1 + b1 = 0 and c2 = Rb1 + y2. It can be shown that the
solutions are c1 = y2/ (2R) and c2 = y2/2. The variables c1, c2, b1, and R denote consumption
in period 1, consumption in period 2, the borrowing and lending position, and the interest
rate, respectively.
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Ex ante, the value of R is unknown. Thus, the expected indirect utility is given by
EV = 2 log (y2/2)− E log(R). (3.4)
Equation (3.4) clearly shows that the expected utility is convex in R. This implies that when
R becomes more volatile, the EV will be higher. The intuition is: When the representative
household is a net borrower in the international capital market, its consumption will decrease
at an accelerated rate with country spread. As a result, when the country spread is more
volatile, the ex ante expected indirect utility is higher.
A relevant case is where the next period output is a decreasing function of today’s interest
rate. Suppose Yt+1 = R
−1/Λ
t , where Λ > 0, then the choices of consumption are c1 =
R
−1−1/Λ
1 /2 and c2 = R
−1/Λ
1 /2. The ex ante expected indirect utility of the household is given
by:
EV = − (1 + 2/Λ)E logR1 − 2 log 2. (3.5)
Compared to (3.4), it is clear that endogenizing output will re-enforce the positive welfare
effect of interest rate volatility.
An example in which country spread shocks are detrimental to welfare can be the case
in which the small open economy is a net lender in the international capital market. To see
this, assume y1 > 0 and y2 = 0 instead of y1 = 0 and y2 > 0 as in the above example. In
this case, the representative household is a net lender in the international capital market. It
is straightforward to show that, ex ante, we have
EV = 2 log (y1/2) + E log(R).
The expected indirect utility is concave in R and it decreases when the volatility of country
spread increases.
Combining the two examples together, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.3 In a two-period small open economy, country spread shocks are welfare
improving if the representative household does not have endowment income today. Country
spread shocks are welfare deleterious if the representative household does not have endowment
income tomorrow.
Ericson and Liu (2009) discuss the welfare effect of interest rate shocks in more detail.
Since the unconditional welfare may increase in the country spread volatility, it is not
a surprise to find out that country spread shocks may actually be welfare improving. In
Section 4.4, we show with the numerical analysis that whether the cost in the benchmark
economy is positive or negative largely depends on the net borrowing and lending position of
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this small open economy and foreign debt adjustment costs. If, on the other hand, the small
open economy is a net borrower in the international capital market or there are costs in
adjusting foreign debt, the increase of volatility of country spread may decrease the welfare
of the representative household.
4 Quantitative analysis
We apply the second order perturbation method discussed in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe
(2004) to obtain the numerical solution to the competitive equilibrium defined in Proposition
2.1. The perturbation method has been widely used in the literature.7 We use the second
order approximation algorithm because the first order approximation method could not
differentiate welfare in two different economies which have the same non-stochastic steady
state but different volatilities. Formally, the first order approximation of utility is given by:
EUt = U + Ux(Ext − x) + Uσσ,
where E denotes the mathematical unconditional expectation operator. A variable without
time-subscript denotes its non-stochastic steady state. The vector x denotes the logarithm
of state variables. The parameter σ controls the volatility of the cycles. The row vector Ux
denotes the first order derivative of utility with respect to x. The variable Uσ denotes the
first order derivative with respect to σ. The first order condition requires that Uσ = 0; see
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004). By assumption, the unconditional expectation of x is zero,
i.e., Ext = 0. For example, E log(zt) = 0 if we assume the standard AR(1) process as in the
literature. It is also true that x = 0. It then comes true that EUt = U . As a result, there is
no way to differentiate policies or economies with the same U .
The second order approximation of utility is given by:
EUt = U + 1/2E(xt − x)′Uxx(xt − x) + 1/2Uσσσ2.
The square matrix Uxx denotes the Hessian matrix with respect to x. The variable Uσσ
denotes the second order derivatives with respect to σ. With second order approximation,
it is clear that both E(xt − x)′Uxx(xt − x) and Uσσ are not necessarily zero. As a result, the
second order approximation allows to evaluate different policies or economies with the same
non-stochastic steady state, in other words, it allows us to obtain the non-zero welfare cost
of the additional volatility of country spread.
7We briefly show how to solve the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium in the appendix. Similar
descriptions can be found in many other places.
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4.1 Welfare cost
We focus on the unconditional cost instead of a conditional cost because the ranking of the
conditional cost will depend upon the assumed initial state of the economy; see Schmitt-
Grohe´ and Uribe (2006a,b). Here the cost refers to welfare cost of the additional volatility
of country spread due to the possibility of sudden stops. Volatilities of country spread may
be different because some economies face the possibility of sudden stops while others do not;
see Aguiar and Gopinath (2007).
In our numerical exercise, an economy with highly volatile country spread can be regarded
as emerging economies. We set the standard deviation of country spread at 0.0196, a value
from Neumayer and Perri (2001), for this type of economy. An economy with less volatile
country spread can be regarded as developed small open economies. The standard deviation
of country spread is set at 0.0096, an artificial number. We assume this smaller number to
serve the purpose to differentiate emerging economies and developed small open economies;
see Mendoza (2001). Making that artificial number smaller or larger (as long as smaller than
0.0196) does not change the qualitative results.
Given the tariff rate and the joint stochastic process of total factor productivity, world
interest rates, and country spread, the unconditional lifetime welfare, EV , can be written as
EV (τ, σ),
where σ denotes the uncertainty of the economy. The above definition means that the
unconditional lifetime utility are a function of economic uncertainty and the tariff rate.
The cost is defined as a lump sum consumption, λ(τ, σ), by which the representative
household is willing to give up to be as well off to avoid uncertainty. This definition can be
regarded as equivalent variation in the sense that the change in consumption is equivalent to
economic uncertainty in terms of its welfare impact; see Mas-Colell et al. (1995, page 82).
Mathematically, the welfare cost of volatility is indirectly defined by
EV (τ, σ) =
{
[c(τ)− λ(τ, σ)− h(τ)ω/ω]1−γ − 1} / (1− γ)
1− [1 + c(τ)− λ(τ, σ)− h(τ)ω/ω]−β1 . (4.1)
The non-stochastic steady consumption and hours are functions of τ and EV is a function
of τ and σ. As a result, the cost is a function of both τ and σ as well. If we remove λ, then
the righthand side of Eq. (4.1) denotes the non-stochastic steady state lifetime welfare of
the representative household at the tariff rate. One thing to note that we can write down
the cost in Eq. (4.1) without changing hours because with GHH momentum utility function,
there is no wealth effect on the labor supply.
Once we solve the model, we obtain the numerical value for EV (τ, σ), c(τ), and h(τ).
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There is only one unknown in Eqs. (4.1), λ(τ, σ). The equation is solved using MATLAB
command, fsolve.m.8 After λ(τ, σ) is obtained, the cost of sudden stops is given by
λ(τ, sudden stops) = λ(τ, σ = 1.96%)− λ(τ, σ = 0.96%). (4.2)
The difference is used to denote the cost we focus on the cost associated with the additional
volatility of country spread due to the possibility of sudden stops.
4.2 Data and calibration
For the benchmark economy, we select the Argentina economy as a representative because
it is well known that Argentina has been suffered a lot from sudden stops. We use three
different data sources. The first one is the International Financial Statistics of International
Monetary Fund, from which we obtain data about GDP, investment (fixed capital formation),
total consumption, exports of goods and services, and imports of goods and services.9 All
data are deseasonalized using the X-12 ARIMA procedure provided by the Bureau of Census
and deflated by the GDP deflator. We apply HP filter to obtain the cyclical components
of each time series and consequently obtain the standard deviations of output, investment,
trade openness and consumption, and the first-order serial autocorrelation of output. They
are listed in Table 3. With the same data source, we set the non-stochastic steady state trade
openness, TO, at 0.31, which is the average of trade openness of Argentina from the first
quarter of 1993 to the first quarter of 2009. The non-stochastic steady state trade balance
to GDP ratio, stb, is set at 0.025.
10
The second data source is the World Trade Organization from which we obtain the data
on tariff rates that governments actually charge on imports and the value of imports for
products.11 Products are identified by 6-digit codes under the World Customs Organizations
internationally agreed “Harmonized System” for defining product categories. The average
of value-weighted ad valorem tariff rates of Argentina for years 1999-2001 is 14%. Thus, we
set the non-stochastic steady state tariff rate at 14%.
8Similarly, we use the same command to solve (4.4) to obtain welfare cost in the Cobb-Douglas utility
case.
9Here total consumption is defined in the same way as in Neumayer and Perri (2005): the sum of private
consumption, government spending, change in the inventories, and statistical errors and discrepancy.
10Note that several papers set stb = 0.5% for Argentina. The difference is that we use the national accounts
measured in domestic currency while those papers use data measured in the U.S. dollars. For the same IMF
data source, if we use the data measured in the U.S. dollars, the average of stb is around 0.55%. In the
sensitivity analysis, we show that they are robust with respect to the values of non-stochastic steady state
trade balance.
11The data are available at www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/org6 e.htm.
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The third data source is the literature. In particular, the non-stochastic steady state
interest rate, R, is set at 1.0275, a value from Uribe and Yue (2006). It is consistent with
the average 11% annual real interest rate faced by a small open economy in the international
capital market. The non-stochastic steady state world interest rate Rus is set at 1.01625, a
value from Mendoza and Uribe (2000). The non-stochastic steady state of net foreign debt is
given by d = TB/(R− 1), where TB denotes the non-stochastic steady state trade balance.
In addition, the law of motion of interest rate is assumed to follow the estimated process in
Neumeyer and Perri (2001):(
Rˆust
CˆRt
)
=
(
0.73 0.04
0.70 0.58
)(
Rˆust−1
CˆRt−1
)
+
(
εt,Rus
εt,CR
)
, (4.3)
where the variables with hat denote the percentage deviations from the trend. The variance
and covariance of innovations are given by σεRus = 0.42%, σεCR = 1.96%, and ρεR,εCR = 0.30.
We calibrate the economy to match the quarterly data of Argentina. The risk aversion
coefficient, γ, is set at 2, a common value used in the business cycle literature. The capital
depreciation rate, δ, is set at 0.025, which has also been widely used in the literature. The
exponent of labor supply in utility, ω, is set at 1.455, a value from Mendoza (1991).12 The
share of labor income in value added, sh, and the share of capital income in value added,
sk, are set at 0.62 and 0.38, respectively, the same as in Neumayer and Perri (2005). The
parameter ϕ in Eq. (2.14) is set at 1.2, a value from Uribe and Yue (2006). The value means
that the representative firm needs to save money to be able to pay at least 1.2 quarter wage
bills.
The parameter αm is chosen to make sure that in the non-stochastic steady state, trade
openness is 31%. The parameters, αk and αh, are determined by two conditions: first, in the
value added, capital income share is sk = 0.38 and labor income share is sh = 0.62; second,
the production is homogeneous of degree one, so αk+αh = 1−αm. The share of investment
in value added, si, is calculated by the following equation:
si =
i
y −m =
δrk
r(y −m) =
δsk
r
.
The non-stochastic steady state rate of return on capital, r, is calculated from the non-
stochastic steady state optimal condition r = R−1+δ. The share of consumption is derived
by using the accounting identity in the non-stochastic steady state, sc = 1− si − stb. From
the calibration so far, the determination of the non-stochastic steady state of c and h is
independent of β1. Thus, the parameter β1 can be calibrated by the following non-stochastic
12As argued in Neumayer and Perri (2005), there is no independent estimate of ω. They set it at 1.6.
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steady state optimal condition:
1 = (1 + c− hω/ω)−β1 R.
The implied value for β1 is 0.0659, which is less than γ = 2. This guarantees the GHH
utility function is suitable for dynamic programming when we close the debt adjustment
cost channel; see Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003).
Once the above structural parameters are calibrated, their values will be kept constant.
One thing worth mentioning is that the non-stochastic steady state trade balance to GDP
share will be changed to accommodate the change of the tariff rate in order to have balanced
non-stochastic steady state. The values for the structural parameters and some long-run
moments are summarized in Table 1.
The last four parameters are the serial correlation of productivity shock, ρ, the standard
deviation of the innovation to productivity shocks, σz, the capital adjustment cost parameter,
φ, and debt adjustment cost parameter, ψ. They are model-specific. For each model, to
calibrate these parameters, we choose values for them, simulate the model, and repeat this
process until the simulated volatilities of output, investment, and trade openness, and the
first order autocorrelation coefficient of output match the data as close as possible.
In the numerical analysis, Five different models are considered with GHH preferences.
Model (a) is the benchmark economy. When we drop the working constraint from the
benchmark economy, we get model (b). If the one-period subjective discount factor in
the benchmark economy is fixed, that is model (c). Model (d) is the benchmark economy
dropping out debt adjustment costs and model (e) is the benchmark model dropping both
debt adjustment costs and the working capital constraint. In Cobb-Douglas preferences
case, we consider two different models: one with a working capital constraint, model (f),
and the other without, model (g). For each model, we re-search for the values of these four
parameters. They are displayed in Table 2.
4.3 Numerical results: Business cycles
The benchmark model - model (a) can explain the business cycles of small open economy
well, as shown by the impulse responses and the second moments. Figure 2 shows the impulse
responses of some key variables to a positive country spread shock. The solid line represents
the economy with a low tariff rate. The dotted line represents the economy with a high tariff
rate. When there is a positive country spread shock, the representative household is willing
to borrow less because the cost of borrowing rises, and a sudden stop of the type addressed
in Chari et al. (2005) emerges. With the working capital constraint, the labor demand
decreases even though the labor supply does not move because of the GHH preferences. As
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a result, the positive country spread shock decreases both hours and output in equilibrium.
Consumption drops because of the negative welfare effect. Investment drops dramatically
because the opportunity cost of investing is high. Trade balance and current account are
thus improved.
Panel (B) and panel (C) in Table 3 display some second moments with different models
associated with GHH preferences. The benchmark economy, a model with a 14% tariff
rate and high country spread volatility, replicates the selected business cycle moments of
Argentina economy. In particular, the generated standard deviation of output is 4.17%, only
0.01 percentage points lower than the observed counterpart. The generated relative standard
deviation of investment to that of output is 3.00, only 0.08 percentage points higher than
the observed one. The generated standard deviation of trade openness is 2.45, very close to
that observed in the data. Finally, the generated first-order serial autocorrelation coefficient
is smaller than the data only by 4 percentage points.
Table 3 also lists the generated second moments of consumption and hours. The gen-
erated ratio of σh/σy, 0.75, seems reasonable compared to 0.57 reported in Neumayer and
Perri (2005), where σh and σy denote the standard deviation of hours and that of output,
respectively. However, the benchmark model produces a very low ratio of σc/σy, where σc
denotes the standard deviation of consumption. In the data, the ratio is about 1.36, while the
generated ratio is only 0.80, about 41% lower. This is true with all the models we consider
in this paper. The reason is the inclusion of the intermediate imported inputs, m, which
allows households smooth consumption. Jahan-Parvar et al. (2009) consider a similar model
without m in which consumption is more volatile than output. To reconcile this discrepancy,
we suspect that by fixing the supply of m one-period ahead, as Boldrin et al. (2001) do with
respect to the quantity supplied of hours, the modified model will generate more volatile
consumption. However, given our goal is not to match the moment, we defer that to the
future research.
When τ = 14%, other models are also able to replicate the standard deviations of output
and investment, and the first serial autocorrelation of output. However, they clearly miss in
generating the standard deviation of trade openness. The benchmark model turns out to be
the best model in replicating business cycles moments of Argentina economy.
The most noticeable feature of Table 3 is that, for the same calibration and the same
process of driving force, economies less open to trade (when τ = 14%) have more volatile
output than economies more open to trade (when τ = 0). To see this, simply compare
models in panel (B) to the corresponding models in panel (C) in the GHH preferences case
in Table 3. This result is in line with Calvo et al. (2004), Calvo and Talvi (2005), and
Edwards (2004a, 2004b) but without assuming liability-dollarization. This directly follows
the intuition we have shown in Section 3.2, even after we introduce capital adjustment costs,
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debt adjustment costs, and productivity shocks. The same pattern can also be seen from
the impulse responses of capital to country spread shocks; see Figure 2.
4.4 Numerical results: Welfare cost
To facilitate the discussion, we start with model (d) and model (e) first, both of which do not
have debt adjustment costs. The difference is that model (d) has a working capital constraint
while model (e) does not. With model (d), the welfare cost of the additional volatility of
country spread is -0.0020419 unit of consumption good in the benchmark economy when
the tariff rate is set at 14%, which is about 0.00204% of its non-stochastic steady state
consumption. This low value of cost is as expected. With the standard real business cycles
models, the welfare cost measured in percentage of consumption is typically small.
The negative welfare cost implies that risk averse households are willing to pay extra to
be able to live in the more volatile economy. In other words, when country spread becomes
more volatile, households will achieve higher welfare. Since Argentina is a net borrower in
the international capital market, this result is not a surprise given the discussion in Section
3.3. In models with GHH preferences, there are at least two ways to obtain a positive
welfare cost: if the small open economy is a lender in the international capital market, or
if the ability to borrow and lend is compromised. The first condition is confirmed by extra
numerical exercises whose results are not reported here. The second condition is evident by
the cost associated with model (b) and model (c).
When the tariff rate is set at 0 in model (d), the welfare cost turns out to be -0.0028634
unit of consumption good, which becomes smaller than that in the τ = 14% case. Thus,
the cost is lower when the economy is more open, which implies that open trade policy is
preferred. The same trade policy recommendation is implied in model (e): when τ = 14%,
the welfare cost of the extra volatility of country spread is -0.0024921 unit of consumption
good (0.2349% of its non-stochastic state consumption). This is higher than the welfare cost
when τ = 0, which is -0.0033563 unit of consumption good.
In this economy, an increase in trade openness always means an improvement in pro-
duction efficiency as we have shown in Section 3.2. When it is free to adjust foreign debt,
there will have no forces against the desire to increase trade openness in order to improve
production efficiency. As a result, open trade policy is always preferred. Since both model
(d) and model (e) recommend open trade policy, it is clear that a working capital constraint
is an irrelevant factor with respect to optimal trade policy here.
Now we turn to models (a) - (c), all of which have debt adjustment costs. With model
(a), the welfare cost is -2.2679e-4 unit of consumption good in the benchmark economy when
τ = 14%. It is smaller than the cost of -1.808e-5 units of consumption good when τ = 0. To
check whether the result is due to the assumed endogenous subjective discount factor or a
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working capital constraint, model (b) and model (c) are also considered. The same pattern
shows up in model (b) and (c): the cost is increasing in trade openness. Thus, it is optimal
to have the closed trade policy when it is costly to adjust foreign debt. Since the result is
obtained in all three models, (a), (b), and (c), it is independent of the endogenous subjective
discount factor and the working capital constraint.
The numerical results show when it is costly to adjust foreign debt, it is not optimal to
have free trade. The underlying reason is because households’ ability to smooth consumption
by borrowing and lending is compromised. In our numerical examples, the ability in the
τ = 14% case is only mildly weakened while it is severely weakened in the free trade case.
The different impact of debt adjustment costs on that ability outweighs the desire to open
the trade to improve the production efficiency. The net effect leads to optimality of the
closed trade policy.
We further consider different values of key parameters. In particular, we consider the
case when households become more risk averse, i.e., increasing the value of γ from 2 to 5. We
also consider the case when labor supply becomes less sensitive to wage rates, i.e., increasing
the value of ω from 1.455 to 1.6.13 Note that Neumayer and Perri (2005) set γ at 5 and ω at
1.6. The numerical results are displayed in Table 4. Once again, we obtain the same results:
no debt adjustment costs, open trade policy is preferred; otherwise the closed trade policy
is preferred.14
Given the above numerical results, we conclude the policy implications are robust. When
there are no debt adjustment costs, the desire to improve production efficient leads to the
optimality of open trade policy. This is independent of the working capital constraint,
the borrowing and lending position, and the key parameter values. When there are debt
adjustment costs, the ability to smooth consumption is severely weakened in the τ = 0 case
and the induced loss outweighs the improvement from production efficiency, which leads to
the optimality of the closed trade policy. This result is independent of the working capital
constraint, the key parameter values, and the endogenous subjective discount factor.
Next, we check whether the policy recommendations are robust to a more general class
of preferences: Cobb-Douglas utility.
13In this case of ω = 1.6, we set β1 = 0.589 to have well-defined non-stochastic steady state.
14In the extra numerical exercises, we find that the borrowing and lending position does not affect the
negative relationship between the cost and trade openness in model (d) and model (e). We also extend model
(e) to two sector economies with homogenous capital and heterogenous capital, and obtain the same policy
implication. The results are not reported here but available upon request.
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4.5 Numerical Results: Cobb-Douglas preferences
We consider the following Cobb-Douglas utility function:
U (ct, ht) =
{[
cχ (1− h)1−χ]1−γ − 1} / (1− γ) .
In this case, we set β(ct, ht) ≡ β∗ and thus θt+1/θt = β∗. With Cobb-Douglas utility, the
inclusion of debt adjustment costs assures stationary behavior of state variables; see Schmitt-
Grohe´ and Uribe (2003). With Cobb-Douglas utility, there is wealth effect on labor supply.
Thus, the welfare cost of volatility is defined as
EV (τ, σ) =
{
[c(τ)− λ(τ, σ)]χ
[
1− h(τ)− 1−χ
χ
λ(τ,σ)
w(τ)
]1−χ}1−γ
− 1
1− β∗ , (4.4)
where w(τ) denotes the non-stochastic steady state wage rate. The reason for λ(τ) showing
up twice is because in the non-stochastic steady state, we have
(1− χ) c
χ (1− h) = w.
As a result, when c decreases, h will increase due to the wealth effect. The cost of sudden
stops is also defined by Eq. (5.3).
We calibrate two new parameters, χ, which denotes the consumption share in the utility,
and β∗. For simplicity, we set β∗ = 1/R and follow Neumayer and Perri (2005) by setting
χ at 0.24. The rest model-invariant parameters are set at the same values as in the GHH
preferences case. The model-specific parameters, ρz, σz, φ, and ψ are re-estimated for the
two models we consider, model (f) and model (g). The results are shown in Panel (D) and
panel (E) in Table 3. Once again, the following findings with GHH preferences remain true
with Cobb-Douglas preferences: (1) output is more volatile when economy is more open,
and (2) the welfare cost of extra volatility of country spread is higher in the τ = 14% case
than that in the τ = 0 case, when it is costly to adjust foreign debt. These are independent
of the working capital constraint. Note that here we cannot drop debt adjustment costs
because they are required to assure the stationary behavior of the economy after we drop
the endogenous subjective discount factor assumption.
However, the policy implication is ambiguous because the non-stochastic steady state
lifetime utility depends on the tariff rate. In particular, with Cobb-Douglas preferences, a
decrease of the tariff rate will induce households to work more on one hand. The resulted
higher output will make households better off. On the other hand, the increased work effort
will make households unhappy. These two forces work against each other. With our Cobb-
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Douglas utility, households’ non-stochastic steady state lifetime utility is maximized when τ
is set at a value less than zero; see Figure 3. Thus, if we start at τ = 14%, it is automatically
true that free trade policy is preferred when there is no uncertainty. Given that our goal is
the welfare cost of additional volatility, we defer the analysis on the justification of a tariff
in a more complicated economic environment in future research.
5 Time-varying tariff rate policy
So far, we have obtained robust results about optimal trade policy: either stay at τ = 14%
when it is costly to adjust foreign debt; or pursue free trade policy when it is free to adjust
foreign debt. One relevant question to ask is whether the government can do better. In
other words, can the economy gain from some kind of time-varying tariff rate policy over the
constant tariff rate policy of 14%?
To answer this question, we extend models (a), (b), (d), and (e) with τ = 14% and high
volatility of country spread by introducing a time-varying tariff rate policy.15 In particular,
we consider the following time-varying policies:
τˆt = ϑ ∗ yˆt, (5.1)
τˆt = −ϑ ∗ CˆRt, (5.2)
where a variable with hat denotes the percentage deviation from its non-stochastic steady
state. The welfare cost of time-varying tariff rate policy is given by
λ(τt, τ) = λ(τt, σ)− λ(τ, σ),
where λ(τt, σ) and λ(τ, σ) are obtained by solving the corresponding Eq. (4.1). When the
cost is positive, it implies that countercyclical policy is detrimental to welfare compared to
the fixed tariff rate policy. When the cost is negative, it implies that countercyclical policy
is welfare-improving.
We consider both countercyclical policy and procyclical policy. In the numerical exercise,
ϑ varies from −2 to 2. The tariff rate is countercyclical when θ > 0 and procyclical when
θ < 0.16 Countercyclical policy is considered because it is natural for the government
to implement certain countercyclical policy to stabilize the economy. Procyclical policy
15We do not include model (c) with the intention to simplify the computational task.
16Note that the term, procyclical (countercyclical), in this paper means that the tariff rate is high when
output is low (high). Our definition is based on whether the policy tends to stabilize output or not. If yes,
then we say the policy is countercyclical, otherwise procyclical. Sometimes this relationship is labeled as
countercyclical (procyclical) in some literature discussion, for example, Bagwell and Staiger (1995).
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is considered because there is bountiful empirical evidence. The most famous example is
the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act passed in June of 1930, which increased the tariff rate to 50%.
In the early 1980s, the tariff rate in Chile rose in the face of the debt crisis. After the
December 1994 Peso crisis, the general tariff rate in Mexico rose from 8.7% in 1994 to a peak
of 12.5% in 1995; see Haltiwanger et al. (2004). The theoretical explanation provided is that
political factors affect decision makers in such a way that the procyclical trade policy is the
equilibrium outcome; see Bagwell and Staiger (1995).
We plot the welfare cost of countercyclical policy against ϑ in Figure 4. The first column
shows the welfare costs associated with the policy (5.1). The second column shows the welfare
costs associated with the policy (5.2). When the cost is negative, it means that the economy
gains from the countercyclical policy over the constant policy; and vice verse. Two results
immediately show up by examining Figure 4. First, when there are no debt adjustment costs
(the working capital constraint does not matter), both policies improve the welfare of the
economy; see the results associated with model (d) and model (c). Second, when there are
debt adjustment costs, the way how the government implements policy matters. In general,
the government should set the tariff rate not as a function of country spread gap, but as a
function of output gap. This is a surprising result. Because both policy (5.1) and policy
(5.2) are countercyclical, therefore we expect both should have increase the welfare. Note
that both results are robust with respect to different parameter values.
The welfare cost of procyclical policy is plotted against ϑ in Figure 5. The first and the
second columns show the welfare costs associated with the policy (5.1) and the policy (5.2),
respectively. When there are no debt adjustment costs (does not matter whether there is a
working capital constraint), both policies reduce the welfare of the economy; see the results
associated with model (d) and model (c). On the contrary, when there are debt adjustment
costs, if the government sets tariff rates as a function of country spread gap, the economy
will gain over the constant tariff rate policy. This may provide an economic justification
why we observe procyclical tariff rate policy in the real life: because it is not free to adjust
foreign debt.
6 Conclusions
We analyze the optimal trade policy when external shocks become more volatile. There are
two forces in the economy. One force is the desire to improve production efficiency. This
leads to the optimality of open trade policy. The second force is the debt adjustment costs,
which compromises the households’ ability to smooth consumption through the international
capital market. In the models considered, this force dominates and leads to the optimality
of a closed trade policy. In addition, countercyclical policy will be preferred if there is
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no financial friction. However, once the economy faces costs in adjusting its foreign debt,
the nature of the policy, countercyclical or procyclical, and the way how the government
implement the policy matter. In general, it is optimal to have tariff rates either to positively
respond to output gap, or to negatively respond to the country spread gap. These findings
are new theoretical results to the literature, which provide economic justifications for two
widely observed phenomena: why tariff rates are on average positive and why procyclical
policy is implemented. One simple reason is that it is not free to adjust foreign debt.
The results show that it is important for the government to consider the costs they face in
the international capital market before it considers to change its trade policy. Given the fact
that those economies with a positive possibility of sudden stops usually face debt adjustment
costs, it is thus recommended, according to our theoretical results, that they adopt a closed
trade policy, even though in this case the economy will be generally more volatile. Thus,
even with the findings in Calvo et al. (2004) and Calvo and Talvi (2005), it is still optimal
to close the door. Further, our results show that the government needs to pay attention to
the anchor to which tariff rates should respond when it tries some forms of countercyclical
tariff rate policy.
Barro (2009) claims if a model does not satisfy the “Atkeson-Phelan principle”, the
welfare analysis based on the model is less meaningful. To satisfy the “Atkeson-Phelan
principle,” it is necessary for the model to have a good explanation power of the equity
prices in emerging economies. Jahan-Parvar et al. (2009) show that debt adjustment costs
do make a difference in explaining the equity returns in emerging economies. This paper
provides an example confirming the claim in Barro (2009) by showing the difference in
optimal trade policy due to debt adjustment costs.
There is, however, scope for improvement in our analysis. For example, in the Cobb-
Douglas preferences case, we impose a tariff without an economic reason. To justify the use
of the tariff rate, it is sufficient to consider some market failures or externality. We defer
this to the future research.
We also assume a reduced form representation of sudden stops simply due to the com-
putational technique concern. The perturbation method we use requires no kinks in policy
functions. However, to endogenize sudden stops, it is necessary to introduce kinks to policy
functions. Some new algorithm with the penalty function analyzed in den Haan and de
Wind (2008) may help solve models with endogenized sudden stops. However, we suspect
that our long-run results would be reversed because sudden stops are rare events.
In addition, some business cycle moments generated by our three-input models are quite
different from those corresponding moments generated by two-input models. For example,
consumption is more volatile than output in Neumayer and Perri (2005). However, it is
more smoother than output in our model (c), which is a three-input counterpart of the two-
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input model in Neumayer and Perri (2005). Some factor inflexibility may help reconcile the
difference. We explore this possibility in the future research.
At last, we only consider three types of shocks. Recently, the literature has argued that
investment-specific shocks are an important driving force of business cycles. Generalizing
the model to allow for investment-specific shocks (and other shocks, such as government
expenditure shocks) is an additional extension we plan to consider in later work.
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7 Tables and figures
Table 1: Calibration
Symbol Definition Value
γ Risk aversion coefficient 2
δ Capital depreciation rate 0.025
ω Exponent of labor supply in utility 1.5
ϕ Working capital constraint parameter 1.2
αm Imported input elasticity 0.1422
αh Labor elasticity 0.5318
αk Capital elasticity 0.3260
β1 Subjective discount factor parameter 0.0659
si Investment share in value added 0.1773
sc Consumption share in value added 0.7977
sh Share of labor income in value added 0.62
sk Share of capital income in value added 0.38
stb Share of trade balance in value added 0.025
RUS Steady state of world interest rate 1.01625
R Steady state of interest rate 1.0275
TO Steady state of trade openness 0.31
r Marginal return to capital 0.0525
τ Average tariff rate 0.14
Notes: Table 1 contains the calibration of structural parameters that are invariant to models for the Ar-
gentina economy.
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Table 2: Calibration of Model Specific Structural Parameters
Models ρz σz φ ψ ϕ
(A) GHH
(a) Benchmark 0.66 1.25e-2 0.70 0.005 1.2
(b) Without WK 0.68 1.25e-e 0.45 0.005 0
(c) With constant β 0.70 1.20e-2 0.60 0.10 1.2
(d) Without B/L 0.64 1.20e-2 1.20 0 1.2
(e) Without (WK and B/L) 0.67 1.20e-2 1.20 0 0
(B) Cobb-Douglas
(f) Benchmark 0.72 1.50e-2 5.5 0.05 1.2
(g) Without WK 0.67 1.60e-2 5.0 0.05 0
Notes: Table 2 contains the calibration of structural parameters that are model specific for the Argentina
economy. Reported values are calibrated model specific parameters in this study. ρz and σz are, respectively,
the first-order autoregressive parameter and the standard deviation of the productivity process. φ and ψ are,
respectively, the cost parameters for capital adjustment costs and borrowing and lending costs. When φ = 0,
the capital adjustment costs are dropped in the model. When ψ = 0, the borrowing and lending costs are
dropped in the model. ϕ is the working capital constraint parameter. When ϕ > 0, a working capital constraint
is introduced into the model. When ϕ = 0, the working capital constraint is dropped. “WK” refers to the model
with the imposition of the working-capital constraint. “B/L” denotes debt adjustment costs.
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Figure 1: Steady state with GHH utility
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Notes: The vertical axis variables represent the aggregate variables of interest. The horizontal variable denotes
the tariff rate. The model is the benchmark economy.
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Table 3: Business Cycle Moments and Welfare Cost
Business Cycle Moments Welfare
Data & Models Of interest Implied Cost
σy
σi
σy
σTO ρy
σc
σy
σh
σy
(10e-4)
(A) Data 4.18 2.92 2.44 0.82 1.36 – –
(B) GHH with τ = 14%
(a) Benchmark 4.17 3.00 2.45 0.78 0.80 0.75 -2.2679
(b) Without WK 4.21 2.88 1.83 0.79 0.80 0.69 -1.0426
(c) With constant β 4.16 2.92 1.82 0.81 0.63 0.68 0.010
(d) Without B/L 4.25 2.84 3.43 0.81 0.73 0.75 -20.419
(e) Without (WK and B/L) 4.18 2.92 3.37 0.79 0.72 0.69 -24.921
(C) GHH with τ = 0%
(a) Benchmark 4.15 2.35 1.20 0.78 0.82 0.73 -0.1808
(b) Without WK 3.70 1.41 1.24 0.79 0.58 0.69 0.0054
(c) With constant β 4.06 2.71 1.73 0.80 0.63 0.68 0.052
(d) Without B/L 4.13 2.66 3.15 0.80 0.84 0.75 -28.634
(e) Without (WK and B/L) 4.08 2.72 3.13 0.78 0.82 0.69 -33.563
(D) Cobb-Douglas with τ = 14%
(f) Benchmark 4.22 2.93 3.05 0.76 0.69 0.43 0.066
(g) Without WK 4.19 2.92 3.16 0.67 0.66 0.45 0.049
(E) Cobb-Douglas with τ = 0%
(f) Benchmark 4.08 2.81 2.87 0.75 0.71 0.42 0.068
(g) Without WK 4.06 2.80 2.97 0.66 0.68 0.44 0.052
Notes: The moments are calculated based on the standard deviation of country spread shocks being 1.96%.
The cost of extra volatility of country spread is defined by Eq. (5.3). All values of standard deviations are in
percentages. σy , σi, σTO, σc, and σh are, respectively, the standard deviations of output, investment, trade
openness, consumption and hours, and ρy denotes the first-order serial autocorrelation of output. The welfare
costs are measured in units of consumption good. “Data” report the unconditional sample moments. We do
not report the data of σh because in general the quality of data for emerging economies is poor; see Aguiar and
Gopinath (2007). Neumeyer and Perri (2005) report a value of 0.57 for σh/σy. “WK” refers to the model with
the imposition of the working-capital constraint. “B/L” denotes debt adjustment costs.
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Table 4: Sensitivity Analysis – Welfare Cost
Different Combinations of key parameters
γ = 2 γ = 2 γ = 5 γ = 5
ω = 1.455 ω = 1.6 ω = 1.455 ω = 1.6
(B) GHH with τ = 14%
(a) Benchmark -2.2679 -2.4701 -1.9306 -2.0940
(b) Without WK -1.0426 -1.4966 -1.0368 -1.4181
(c) With constant β 0.0100 0.0516 0.0265 0.0516
(d) Without B/L -20.419 -23.376 -23.745 -26.636
(e) Without (WK and B/L) -24.921 -26.919 -33.416 -34.198
(C) GHH with τ = 0%
(a) Benchmark -0.1808 -0.3288 -0.1788 -0.3435
(b) Without WK 0.0054 0.0104 0.0028 0.0099
(c) With constant β 0.0518 0.0845 0.0483 0.0677
(d) Without B/L -28.634 -30.571 -41.633 -42.181
(e) Without (WK and B/L) -33.563 -34.331 -52.823 -50.579
Notes: The cost of extra volatility of country spread is defined by Eq. (5.3) and measured in 10e-4 unit of
consumption good. “WK” refers to the model with the imposition of the working-capital constraint. “B/L”
denotes debt adjustment costs. When the exponent of labor supply in utility, ω, is set at 1.6, the subjective
discount factor parameter, β1, will be re-calibrated at 0.0589.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to a positive country spread shock
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debt adjustment costs. The solid line corresponds to 0% tariff rate. The dotted Line corresponds to 14% tariff
rate.
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Figure 3: Steady state with Cobb-Douglas utility
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Figure 4: Welfare cost of countercyclical policies with GHH preferences
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Notes: The vertical axis represents the welfare cost of countercyclical tariff rate around τ = 14% compared to
the fixed tariff rate policy at τ = 14%. The horizontal variable denotes the response coefficient of tariff rates to
the gap of x, where x denotes output in the first column, and country spread in the second column.
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Figure 5: Welfare cost of procyclical policies with GHH preferences
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Notes: The vertical axis represents the welfare cost of procyclical tariff rate around τ = 14% compared to the
fixed tariff rate policy at τ = 14%. The horizontal variable denotes the response coefficient of tariff rates to the
gap of x, where x denotes output in the first column, and country spread in the second column.
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8 Appendix - Not for Publication
8.1 One-sector model with GHH utility
The Lagrange is
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
θt{U(ct, ht) + µt[ztF (kt, ht,mt) + Γt + dt −Rt−1dt−1 − ct − it
−(1 + τ)mt − Φ(kt+1 − kt)] + µtqt [(1− δ)kt + it − kt+1]}.
The optimality conditions are:
µt =
(
ct − h
ω
t
ω
)−γ
,
hω−1t = wt,
µt [1−Ψ′(dt)] =
(
1 + c˜t − h˜
ω
t
ω
)−β1
RtEtµt+1,
1 + τ = (αm)ztk
αk
t h
αh
t m
αm−1
t ,
qt = 1,
µt [1 + φ(kt+1 − kt)] =
(
1 + c˜t − h˜
ω
t
ω
)−β1
Etµt+1[
1− δ + φ(kt+2 − kt+1) + zt+1αkkαk−1t+1 hαht+1mαmt+1
]
,
0 = αkztk
αk−1
t h
αh
t m
αm
t − rt,
0 = αhztk
αk
t h
αh−1
t m
αm
t − wt [1 + ϕ (Rt − 1) /Rt] ,
0 = αmztk
αk
t h
αh
t m
αm−1
t r
m
t ,
yt + dt = Rt−1dt−1 + ct + it + (1 + τ)mt +
φ
2
(kt+1 − kt)2 +Ψ(dt),
yt = ztk
αk
t h
αh
t m
αm
t ,
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + it,
ct = c˜t,
ht = h˜t.
We can rearrange and get the following
ht = $2 (ztk
αk
t )
$1 ,
mt = $3 (ztk
αk
t )
ω$1 ,
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where
Xt = [1 + ϕ (Rt − 1) /Rt] ,
$1 =
1
ω − αh − ωαm ,
$2 =
[(
αh
Xt
)1−αm ( αm
1 + τ
)αm]$1
,
$3 =
Xt
αh
αm
1 + τ
[(
αh
Xt
)1−αm ( αm
1 + τ
)αm]$1ω
.
8.1.1 Functional forms and non-stochastic steady state
The functional forms are:
F (k, h,m) = kαkhαhmαm ,
1 = αk + αh + αm,
F (kT, hT,m) = kαkThαhTmαm ,
F (kN, hN) = kαkNhαhN ,
αk ≥ 0, αh ≥ 0, αk + αh ≤ 1,
U(c, h) =
[c− ω−1hω]1−γ − 1
1− γ ,
Φ(x) =
φ
2
x2,
Ψ(dt) = ψ
[
exp
(
dt − d¯
)− 1] ,
β(c, h) =
(
1 + c− h
ω
ω
)−β1
.
In the non-stochastic steady state, the optimality conditions are reduced to
d = Rd+ c+ i+m− kαkhαhm1−αk−αh ,
i = δk,
µ = (c− ω−1hω)−γ,
hω−1 = αhkαkhαh−1m1−αk−αh ,
1 =
(
1 + c− h
ω
ω
)−β1
R,
1 + τ = (1− αk − αh)kαkhαhm−αk−αh ,
q = 1,
R =
[
1− δ + αkkαk−1hαhm1−αk−αh
]
.
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Rearrange and we get three equations of k, h, and m only:
X
αh
= kαkhαh−ωm1−αk−αh ,
1 + τ
(1− αk − αh) = k
αkhαhm−αk−αh ,
R + δ − 1
αk
= kαk−1hαhm1−αk−αh ,
where X = [1 + ϕ (R− 1) /R]. We can solve for h as:
h =
[(
R + δ − 1
αk
)αk (X
αh
)αh (1 + τ
αm
)αm] 1αh(1−ω)
.
Notice without m and without the working capital constraint, the solution to h becomes:
h =
[(
R + δ − 1
αk
)αk ( 1
αh
)αh] 1αh(1−ω)
.
Consider αk+αh = 1 when there is no m, the solution is the same as the one in SGU (2003),
which is:
h =
[(
1
1− αk
)(
R + δ − 1
αk
) αk
1−αk
] 1
1−ω
.
Thus, the output is
Y = kαkhαhmαm
=
[
X
αh
αk
R + δ − 1h
ω
]αk
hαh
[
X
αh
αm
1 + τ
hω
]αm
=
(αh
X
)αh ( αk
R + δ − 1
)αk ( αm
1 + τ
)αm
×[(
X
αh
)αh (R + δ − 1
αk
)αk (1 + τ
αm
)αm]1+ ωαh(1−ω)
=
[(
X
αh
)αh (R + δ − 1
αk
)αk (1 + τ
αm
)αm] ωαh(1−ω)
.
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8.1.2 Derivation of Eq. (3.3)
We can rearrange optimality condition with respect to kt and get the following
rt = αkztk
αk−1
t h
αh
t m
αm
t
= αkztk
αk−1
t [$2 (ztk
αk
t )
$1 ]
αh [$3 (ztk
αk
t )
ω$1 ]
αm
= αk$
αh
2 $
αm
3 z
1+$1αh+$1ωαm
t k
αk−1+$1αkαh+$1αkωαm
t
= αk$
αh
2 $
αm
3 z
$1ω
t k
−(ω−1)αh$1
t ,
where
$1 =
1
ω − αh − ωαm ,
$2 =
[(
αh
Xt
)1−αm ( αm
1 + τ
)αm]$1
,
$3 =
Xt
αh
αm
1 + τ
[(
αh
Xt
)1−αm ( αm
1 + τ
)αm]$1ω
.
We can further simplify the expression for rt by simplifying $
αh
2 $
αm
3 , which is given by
$αh2 $
αm
3 =
{[(
αh
Xt
)1−αm ( αm
1 + τ
)αm]$1}αh
{
Xt
αh
αm
1 + τ
[(
αh
Xt
)1−αm ( αm
1 + τ
)αm]$1ω}αm
=
(
αh
Xt
)(1−αm)$1(αh+ωαm)−1( αm
1 + τ
)αm$1(αh+ωαm)+1
.
And,
$αh2 $
αm
3 =
{[(
αh
Xt
)1−αm ( αm
1 + τ
)αm]$1}αh
{
Xt
αh
αm
1 + τ
[(
αh
Xt
)1−αm ( αm
1 + τ
)αm]$1ω}αm
=
(
αh
Xt
)(1−αm)$1(αh+ωαm)−1( αm
1 + τ
)αm$1(αh+ωαm)+1
.
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8.2 One-sector model with Cobb-Douglas utility
If instead we assume Cobb-Douglas utility function
U(c, h) =
[
cχ (1− h)1−χ]1−γ − 1
1− γ ,
we then have the following non-stochastic steady state optimality conditions:
0 = TB + c+ i+m− kαkhαhm1−αk−αh ,
d+ TB = Rd,
i = δk,
µ =
[
cχ (1− h)1−χ]−γ χcχ−1 (1− h)1−χ ,
(1− χ) c
χ (1− h)
X
αh
= kαkhαh−1m1−αk−αh ,
1 = βR,
1 + τ = (1− αk − αh)kαkhαhm−αk−αh ,
q = 1,
R + δ − 1 = αkkαk−1hαhm1−αk−αh .
From the optimality conditions with respect to k and m
1 + τ
(1− αk − αh) = k
αkhαhm−αk−αh ,
R + δ − 1
αk
= kαk−1hαhm1−αk−αh ,
we have
m =
(1− αk − αh)
αk
R + δ − 1
1 + τ
k = F1k.
Thus,
y = kαkhαhm1−αk−αh =
R + δ − 1
αk
k = F2k.
For the given stb =
TB
kαkhαhm1−αk−αh−m , we can rewrite the period budget constraint as:
(1− stb)
(
kαkhαhm1−αk−αh −m) = c+ δk.
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Plug the expression of y and m into the period budget constraint, we get
(1− stb) (F2k − F1k) = c+ δk.
Plug the expression of y and m into the period budget constraint, we get
c = (1− stb) (F2 − F1) k − δk = F3k.
Rewrite the optimality condition with respect to h:
(1− χ) c
χ (1− h)
X
αh
= kαkhαh−1m1−αk−αh ,
as
(1− χ) c
χ (1− h)
X
αh
=
(1− χ)F3k
χ (1− h)
X
αh
= kαkhαh−1m1−αk−αh =
y
h
=
F2k
h
,
F4
(1− h) =
F2
h
.
Thus,
h∗ =
F2
F2 + F4
=
R+δ−1
αk
R+δ−1
αk
+ (1−χ)F3X
χαh
=
R+δ−1
αk
R+δ−1
αk
+ (1−χ)[(1−stb)(F2−F1)−δ]X
χαh
.
Plug h∗ and m into the optimality condition with respect to k, we get
R + δ − 1
αk
= kαk−1 (h∗)αh (F1k)
1−αk−αh ,
kαh = (h∗)αh (F1)
1−αk−αh αk
R + δ − 1 ,
= (h∗)αh
(
(1− αk − αh)
1 + τ
R + δ − 1
αk
)1−αk−αh αk
R + δ − 1
= (h∗)αh
(
(1− αk − αh)
1 + τ
)1−αk−αh (R + δ − 1
αk
)−αk−αh
.
8.3 Solving dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
This section shows the general steps to solve dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models
by using the perturbation method. There are many other methods that can be used to
solve the DSGE models, such as policy function iteration, value function iteration, and etc.
The advantage is perturbation method is that it can easily handle a model with many state
variables.
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1. Set up the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. After the first order approx-
imation, list all the equilibrium conditions in the following form:
AExt+1 = Bxt,
where
xt ≡
[
st
ct
]
.
The variable st denotes state variables. In this paper, state variables include: endoge-
nous but predetermined variables: capital and debt; and exogenous state variables:
productivity, world interest rate, and government expenditure. The variable ct denotes
choice variables. In this paper, choice variables include: consumption, hours, and etc.
The number of choices is assumed to be nc.
2. We can apply the Schur decomposition method to the above linear system equation to
get the following
qAzz′Ext+1 = qBzz′xt,
or
aEyt+1 = byt,
where a = qAz, b = qBz, and yt = z
′xt. And a and b are triangle matrix.
3. Partition the system, we get(
a11 a12
0 a22
)
Eyt+1 =
(
b11 b12
0 b22
)
yt,
where y2t is of the order nc × 1.
4. We thus have the following
a22Ey
2
t+1 = b22y
2
t .
Here we put terminal condition on yt+1, such that limj→∞Ety2t+j < ∞. Given that
|a22
b22
| < 1, the only solution is y2t = 0.
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5. Since
y2t = 0 = z
′
12st + z
′
22ct,
we get the solution for the choice variables:
ct = −z′−122 z′12st.
6. Go one step ahead, since y2t = 0, we have
a11Ey
1
t+1 = b11y
1
t
⇒ a11E (z′11st+1 + z′12ct+1) = b11z′11st + z′12ct.
Given the fact that ct+1 is a function of st+1 and st+1 is known at period t, we can
solve for st+1 as
st+1 =
[
z′11 − z′21z
′−1
22 z
′
12
]
a−111 b11
[
z′11 − z′21z
′−1
22 z
′
12
]
st.
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